Outside the Accords: ASEAN and the Quiet Politics of Exclusion in Space Governance

By Shreyasree Paul (Presidency School of Law, Presidency University, Bengaluru)

Our Moon is no longer just a symbol of human exploration but rather a rapid evolving site for extraction, infrastructure, and commerce which shapes global space governance. The methods used to govern the activities of humankind in outer space are being transformed dramatically. The lengthy negotiations of treaties among a large number of countries such as the Outer Space Treaty, 1967, are being replaced by the development of much more flexible governing systems based on principles rather than treaty negotiations, which will occur in diverse locations. The Artemis Accords signed by the US and launched in 2020, represent the highest level of ambition in the new space governance framework and serve as a pilot project for the Accords.

However, despite the rising number of countries signing onto the Artemis Accords, there are serious questions regarding the impact of this initiative on those countries that do not sign onto the accords. For instance, how will countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), where space-based infrastructure is critically important and yet the ability of those countries to participate in the forming of international space norms is very limited, be affected by informal space governance agreements such as the Artemis Accords. The answer to this question reveals an ominous future for the governing of international space law. We are witnessing a shift to a two-tiered framework of international space governance. Governance frameworks will continue to shape behaviours and activities that occur outside their formal borders. There is a significant power asymmetry in law-making capacity as signatory states shape the emerging space governance norms through coordinated practice and standard-setting, while the non-signatory states remain materially affected yet largely excluded from influencing the resulting framework.

The Artemis Accords as a Soft Law Instrument: Voluntary Commitments and Normative Consequences

The Artemis Accords are a set of non-binding principles designed to support the implementation of the Outer Space Treaty in light of increased future lunar exploration and development. They have identified objectives of peaceful utilization, transparency, interoperability, emergency assistance, registration, sharing of resources, protection of cultural and scientific heritage, development and use of outer space resources, conflict mitigation, and debris mitigation, which are primarily noncontroversial. NASA has stated that these principles merely serve to articulate existing obligations under the Outer Space Treaty and they do not create new international law. Unlike treaties, the Accords bypass the cumbersome machinery of multilateral negotiation.

The voluntary, complementary nature of the Accords makes them both attractive and uncertain. Unlike treaties, which require multilateral negotiations, the Accords allow for quick utilization through bilateral agreements between State Parties. The result is an asymmetric framework substantially influenced by the priorities of the primary author of the framework.

Importantly, the fact that the Accords have a "soft law" status does not diminish their functional value. On the contrary, international law has long recognised that state practice crystallise into customary norms binding even on non-participants. When the signatory states coordinate their missions, establish safety zones during missions, and create a consistent framework of using space resources, other non-signatory countries will be confronted with the realities of such occurrences, regardless of whether they are participating in the Artemis programme.

ASEAN As The Silent Stakeholder

To understand why this matters, consider ASEAN. Comprising of ten Southeast Asian nations, namely, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, it represents over 680 million people, a collective GDP exceeding $3.6 trillion, and some of the world's most disaster-prone and climate-vulnerable territories. Yet ASEAN's relationship with space is defined by paradox: profound dependence, minimal agency.

ASEAN states rely extensively on satellite systems for essential functions such as communications, disaster management, navigation, maritime logistics, environmental and sustainability monitoring, etc. making uninterrupted access to satellite infrastructure essential to both development and security.

This dependence, however, is not matched by participation in space governance. As of early 2025, only the Philippines and Malaysia from ASEAN have signed the Artemis Accords. The other ASEAN nations with nascent space programmes and significant territorial equities remain conspicuously absent. ASEAN itself has no regional space policy framework, no collective position on lunar resource governance, and no coordinated strategy for engaging with emerging norms. The bloc functions as a rule-taker in a field characterised by high material stakes but limited normative influence, even as a body which holds global sustainability influence.

Influence Without Inclusion: The Normative Spillover Problem

The exclusionary nature of the Artemis Accords is not a harmless occurrence as it may be signed on a voluntary basis but their effects extend far beyond the formal signs of agreement. Specifically, Artemis Accords consists the framework for "safety zones," or "areas of protection" where interference with spacecraft and lunar missions must be avoided at all costs. However, the actual scope and subject of "safety zones" are not defined. Rather, they shall ultimately be determined by the activity of particular spacefaring nations as they operationalise the Artemis Accords. Should these nations, mostly leading space-farers, create large safety zones around lunar resources then both the opportunity costs associated with being excluded will be incurred by all actors in the space domain, including non-signatories.

Additionally, similar concerns arise with respect to the extraction of space resources that the Artemis Accords anticipate will be appropriated by nations that extract them, assuming that the extraction of space resources is permissible under the OST, which is very contentious. It also acts as a potential conflict with the national appropriation prohibition principle of Article II. Nevertheless, should the large spacefaring nations signing the Artemis Accords operationalise a latitude of permissive interpretations of the OST through sustained activity, then the non-signatories face a dilemma. They can either accept the norms created by others or face the prospect of becoming marginalised in a very competitive outer space environment.

This process of diffusing norms that we observe is especially concerning in the legal postulates of “global commons.” Docility with these norms is driven by practical necessity as opposed to the force of legal obligation. The Accords’ developed interoperability standards and safety zone protocols, and by doing so, they developed systems that were incompatible with non-signatories and established benchmarks of responsible behaviour that may disadvantage actors operating outside the framework. Additionally, the way they established their resource rights created a barrier to those who came late to the conversation, creating a sense of exclusivity around resource rights.

As a result, these norms emerge not through inclusive debates but through the accumulated practise of select actors, recalling earlier eras when international rules were unilaterally shaped only by the powerful. The ASEAN region will be adversely affected by these, leaving them bereft of feasible options available for determining or responding to which standards will govern that region.

Toward a Two-Tier Space Order

Frameworks such as the Artemis Accords contribute to a differentiated model of space governance. Instead of a standard global framework that defines global interaction and limits, many countries are working to establish norms through an informal network of "coalition of the willing,” which creates a unique governing system that has a difference in those that are creating it to those that come in contact with it after it has been established.

Under this model, the signatories of this lunar coalition will continue to develop guiding principles through two primary activities: (1) by developing and executing missions jointly; and (2) by establishing common technical practices for the missions executed.

Although the non-signatories are not formally bound to follow these principles, they must still operate alongside international space missions and data-sharing frameworks grounded in Article I of the Outer Space Treaty’s “Common Heritage of Mankind” principle, which treats outer space as the shared province of humanity. Presently, countries that do not formally sign agreements meet various de facto expectations as part of the global governance system.

This goal is even more pronounced when one thinks of the specific space nations in particular regions such as ASEAN. Cumulatively, when thinking of ASEAN's regional topography and geopolitics, it is more than just a matter of exclusion but rather it also creates a perceived hierarchy. Consequently, the legitimation process for governance norms is primarily based on the perception of repetition of practice and not by collective endorsement of the governance norm. As a result, the concentration of legitimation is placed in a small number of space nations removes the perception of global commons from the legitimacy process.

Inculcating Inclusion Without Accession

Consequentially, what measures should be taken now? The significance of the Artemis Accords is not merely in their establishment, but rather how the Artemis Accords create the ability to exert the Global North’s influence. While the framework cannot be simply disregarded, we must work together to create pathways toward greater inclusion in shaping the norms that dictate how we expand beyond Earth into outer space. The current non-signatories should not be marginalised, as they are future stakeholders with an institutional connection to space infrastructures, enhanced sustainability mechanisms, and a vested interest in how these infrastructures are governed.

For ASEAN, the only requirement for inclusion does not necessitate signing the accords. Rather, it could create a collective platform to engage with emerging frameworks through joint regional coordination for space policies, particularly with respect to resource governance, orbital sustainability, and equitable access. It would be a loud and insistent message that its shared priorities regarding space governance are means for strengthening the normative voice of ASEAN, thereby reducing the risk that will be overlooked as lunar and cis-lunar activities begin to progress rapidly.

Globally, inclusive international norm development continues to require the use of multilateral forums such as UNCOPUOS for this reason, as they provide legitimacy through participation. As the Artemis Accords continue to influence space governance by means of practice, the critical question remains whether legitimacy will continue to be associated with participation or become more aligned with coalitions of select states, the end result being long-term effects for ASEAN and other similarly positioned regions.