Can a State Block The Sky? Starlink, Spectrum and The Limits of Space Freedom

By Taru Jain (MNLU, Mumbai) and Shreya Sharma (HPNLU, Shimla)

I. Introduction: The Starlink Paradox

In June 2025, Starlink, led by Elon Musk, obtained the required licences to begin operations in India. In August, the company was also granted provisional spectrum. However, this approval came with specific conditions. The final allocation of operational spectrum has not yet been issued and will only be granted after the necessary security clearances are completed. At one point, there were even discussions that India might not permit Starlink to operate in the country because of security concerns.

In 2021, Starlink began accepting pre-orders from Indian consumers without having obtained the necessary licence to operate in the country. Consequently, the Department of Telecommunications directed the company to refund the amounts collected. Further concerns arose in December 2024, when Starlink routers and antennas were recovered in violence-affected areas of Manipur. Around the same time, law-enforcement authorities in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands reported that drug traffickers were using “Starlink Mini”, a portable satellite internet device, for communication.

Even though Elon Musk had claimed that Starlink services were no longer operational in India, intelligence agencies suspect that the devices continued to function in vulnerable regions like Manipur, which may have helped militant groups gain access to online communication. These incidents collectively led the government to reconsider its approach towards Starlink’s operations in India.

As a response, the Broadband India Forum (BIF)- an association of Big Tech and satellite companies- wrote a letter to the government accusing telcos of attempting to block the entry of next-generation satellite services into India.

While Starlink was finally granted operating licenses in India, this conflict raised an important legal question: Can a sovereign State lawfully block or restrict signals beamed from outer space? And what does this mean for the international principle of free use of outer space?

II. The International Law Framework

Article I of the Outer Space Treaty establishes that outer space, including celestial bodies and orbits, is a realm open for exploration and use by all States on an equal basis, for the benefit of all humankind, and must be free from discrimination in access and scientific investigation.

The ITU Radio Regulations and ITU Constitution (No. 197 of Article 45) provide that “all stations, whatever their purpose, must be established and operated in such a manner as not to cause harmful interference to the radio services or communications of other Members, recognized operating agencies, or other authorized operating agencies which carry on a radio service, and which operate in accordance with the Radio Regulations". 

International telecommunication law recognises ‘the sovereign right of each State to regulate its telecommunication, and signals may not be transmitted into the territory of another State without prior consent.

But can a nation directly interfere with a space signal that threatens its sovereignty? In the ongoing multilateral discussions on threats to outer space, interference with space signals has been widely recognised as being ‘irresponsible behaviour’. Although it does not quite reach the threshold of what is considered a use of force under international law, and is therefore not specifically prohibited under the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter). In certain circumstances, interference with space signals may, according to the European Union, have ‘dramatic consequences on international peace, security and stability’.

This is the reason why nations cannot directly/physically block signals from space.

So what can nations do? The United States has expressly stated that any form of ‘purposeful interference with space systems, including supporting infrastructure, will be considered an infringement of a nation's rights’, and that it reserves the right to respond to such interference at a ‘time, place, manner, and domain’ of their choosing.

Similarly, under the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, Section 4(1) vests the Central Government with the exclusive privilege of establishing, maintaining, and working telegraphs within India. The proviso to this section empowers the Government to grant licences to private entities subject to such conditions and payments as it may think fit. This provision forms the statutory basis for India’s telecom licensing regime and makes prior authorisation mandatory for any entity seeking to provide telecommunication services.

Further, Section 5(2) authorises the Central Government to intercept, suspend, or regulate telecommunication services in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, public order, or friendly relations with foreign States. Security clearance and lawful interception capabilities are therefore standard licensing conditions imposed on telecom service providers, including satellite communication operators.

III. Can a State “Geofence” Satellite Internet?

The key distinction is between blocking space and regulating Earth. A State cannot lawfully jam or disable satellites in orbit. That would amount to illegal interference with a space object operating in a non-appropriable domain.

Unlike terrestrial internet services that travel through ground-level cables and mobile towers, satellite internet signals orbit above the atmosphere and do not traverse national territory in the conventional sense. This raises the question whether a State can lawfully restrict access to satellite internet within its borders, which is a concept sometimes described as “geofencing” satellite internet by controlling ground infrastructure rather than the space segment itself.

At the most basic level, States do not have the power to obstruct or tamper with satellites once they are in orbit, as outer space is regulated by international space law, which bars national ownership and unlawful interference with space objects. Any attempt to directly disrupt satellite signals in orbit would constitute impermissible interference with systems operating beyond territorial jurisdiction. Nevertheless, States retain full regulatory control over the ground-based components of satellite internet, including user terminals, earth stations, spectrum allocation, and data transmission routes. Since these elements are located within national territory, they are subject to domestic legal and regulatory control.

In the Indian context, the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) has recently introduced strict security requirements for satellite communication providers. These rules mandate that no terminal may connect to the network from outside a defined geographical area or through gateways located abroad. In effect, the use of satellite internet is confined within Indian airspace by regulating how terminals function and how data enters and exits the country. Service providers are also obligated to enable lawful interception, comply with monitoring requirements, and block access to prohibited websites, in line with obligations imposed on conventional telecom operators.

The framework further requires satellite companies to secure prior security approvals for gateway installations in India and to ensure that all Indian user data is routed only through infrastructure located within the country. This creates a form of “geofencing” at the terrestrial level, rather than attempting control in outer space.

Accordingly, although a State cannot interfere with satellites in orbit, it can assert its sovereignty and security interests by regulating the land-based interfaces of satellite internet and subjecting them to domestic law and oversight.

IV. India’s Starlink–OneWeb Conflict

The conflict between Starlink and Indian authorities illustrates this legal architecture in action. Starlink’s acceptance of pre-orders without a licence was unlawful under Indian telecom law. By contrast, OneWeb obtained a Global Mobile Personal Communications by Satellite (GMPCS) licence only after fulfilling security, localisation and compliance requirements.

The later dispute between COAI and BIF over spectrum pricing further shows that satellite freedom does not equal telecom freedom. While satellite spectrum is coordinated internationally under the ITU, service provision within India remains subject to Indian fiscal, security and regulatory controls. TRAI’s proposal to levy spectrum usage charges and licence fees on satcom providers triggered resistance from telcos, who argued unfair competition, while BIF maintained that satellite services are fundamentally different from terrestrial networks.

Yet the underlying legal reality remains unchanged: outer space is free, but market access is not.

V. Digital Sovereignty vs Space Freedom

Outer space may be a global common, but cyberspace is territorially fragmented. States do not control satellites, but they control who receives signals, how those signals are decrypted, which gateways operate, and which companies may lawfully function.

The future conflict will not be fought in orbit but at the interface of space law and telecom law - and India is already setting the template.