Precluding an Arms Race in external Space: Redefining PAROS in a period of Militarisation and Commercial Space Activity

By Suchismita Padhy (National Forensic Sciences University, Gujarat)

1.    Preface

In the global context, outer space has recently emerged as a very valuable resource. The modern world depends on satellites. They have become the overlooked foundation of contemporary life, essential for everything, from global communication and GPS directions to national security and international financial transactions. The greater the reliance increases, the more security concerns arise, including improvements in Anti-Satellite (ASAT) capabilities, electronic warfare, and the dangers of cascading Kessler Syndrome. A major shortcoming is that, while technology is advancing rapidly, current space laws do not keep pace; instead, they remain outdated, failing to close salient loopholes that facilitate the easy militarisation of space. This blog will review the emerging pitfalls in space security and assess the critical need for robust and streamlined global governance.

2.    Understanding PAROS within International Space Law

PAROS, or the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, is a global initiative aimed at keeping the orbital terrain a sanctuary for peace rather than a battleground. In simple terms, it seeks to help countries from initiating a competitive cycle of planting munitions in space or using force against satellites. This ideal gained inspiration from the United Nations in the early 1980s, primarily through the Conference on Disarmament, and has since been supported by numerous General Assembly resolutions. PAROS is deeply embedded in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which authorises the use of space for the benefit of all humankind and for peaceful purposes. While the original convention explicitly bans only munitions of mass destruction, PAROS attempts to close legal loopholes regarding conventional munitions and terrestrial pitfalls. Specifically, PAROS is not yet a listed transnational convention; it remains a pressing guiding objective aimed at fostering a secure, stable, and sustainable space terrain for posterity.

3.    Why Does Space Law Fall Short in Precluding an Arms Race

In this aspect, however, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, despite its merits, is also overly restrictive in scope. The treaty does not mention anything about non-nuclear explosions and ASATs, only prohibiting the emplacement of WMD into orbit. This leaves a legal gap in which kinetic or electronic non-nuclear artillery could be developed that is not strictly prohibited by the treaty, due to issues with enforcement, monitoring, and verification. The regime is also a laggard in enforcement, monitoring, and verification mechanisms. The internal content of the payload is not an enforcement requirement, nor is orbital preparation finished and at peace. So, the onus is on voluntary collaboration, which tends not to occur in a competitive scenario. And these legal texts, too, are very state-centred, reverting to an age of transnational relations. They can’t see the unbridled, rapid dissemination of private interests spreading wildfires across space, and the complications that come with trying to keep up with binary-use technology, not to mention the ultramodern risks like cyber warfare. The problem is that legal geography hasn’t kept pace with technological advancements, so trying to use a framework intended to prevent an arms race in space is unlikely to work very effectively.

4.    Contemporary Challenges to Space Security

4.1 Militarisation and Anti-Satellite Capabilities

Space has become a strategic battleground, and the focus on counterspace abilities has skyrocketed. Recent discourse has increasingly focused on the strategic application of anti-satellite (ASAT) technologies, such as advanced kinetic interceptors and directed-energy weapons, for the interception and destruction of satellites critical to orbital operations (Space Threat Assessment). That’s got a significant problem, though: those capabilities make it less stable for everyone by creating a mentality in which countries feel they have to go first and gain an edge in a fight. Of course, that kind of behaviour is fraught with the risk of escalation, we could see attacks on the satellites that provide our early warning data misinterpreted as a sign of something bigger, like a nuclear or even terrestrial conflict.

4.2 Binary- Use Technologies and Private Space Actors

Ultramodern space operations increasingly rely on binary-use systems that contemporaneously serve mercenary marketable requirements and military command functions. The “New Space” period is characterised by the rapid-fire expansion of private actors planting massive satellite constellations, which complicates the distinction between mercenary and military means. Likewise, many modern technologies designed for a single purpose, such as fixing satellites or clearing space junk, have features that could easily be repurposed for more aggressive applications. All this has happened so fast that we’re still trying to figure out where the lines are drawn for who is actually responsible when things go down in a war zone.

4.3 Space Debris and Orbital Traffic

The rate of space junk creation is escalating out of control and poses a serious threat to any country that utilises space practically (ESA, February 28, 2017). It’s starting to feel like a total nightmare as more and more Satellites and other pieces of junk crowd the same areas of space, and the risk of collisions is increasing by the day. The cascading collision phenomenon known as the Kessler Syndrome describes a runaway chain reaction in which debris-generating impacts trigger successive collisions, dramatically increasing orbital congestion (NASA, 2023). This situation is increasingly posing long-term challenges, and it is becoming evident that specific regions of space may eventually become excessively hazardous or even permanently unviable in the foreseeable future, at least according to current projections. To continue operating in this chaotic environment, satellites are being forced to constantly swerve out of the way of danger, which not only consumes truckloads of fuel but also significantly reduces their lifespan.

4.4 Cybersecurity pitfalls in the space structure

Space systems are increasingly exposed to the risk of negative influence from digital threats in space, as well as links and ground segments. Adversaries use electronic jamming and spoofing to deny communication links or deceive critical navigation and timing information. More sophisticated cyberattacks could also target command-and-control systems to render a satellite inoperable or permanently steal sensitive information (Verma, 2025). One major challenge is attribution - determining whether the satellite anomaly was caused by a malicious cyberattack or by a natural or purely technical failure.

5.    Responsibility Gaps and Responsibility in Modern Space Heating

Nations hold transnational power and responsibilities for all public conditioning, including actions taken by NGOs or groups of NGOs. That job entails endless supervision, but over several years, the domestic non-supervisory workforce has been surpassed by marketable actors. Although the Liability Convention outlines a framework for compensation, there is an alarming lack of transnational consensus on methods and norms for estimating damages, particularly regarding payment norms. Criterion tasks another technical challenge to accountability, as it is technically difficult to trace non-trackable debris or subtler electronic interference directly to a specific entity (HDI Global, 2023). Much that is comparable appears to be internally type-differentiable malfunctions, making it more difficult to identify fault-based claims. These legal vacuums could affect developing countries more than others, and valuable items found in their territories might be taken without strong political and/or legal protection, such as an independent control system or the classic logrolling power of old space powers. More recent members of the orbital club are more strategically vulnerable, as a single failure could impact their emerging programs. And they then find themselves floundering in the ultra-modern, not knowing how responsibility is to be systematised without benchmarks. These norms can be enforced and explicitly stated in legal instruments.

6.    Strengthening PAROS Legal and Policy Pathways Forward

Preventing an arms race in outer space through enhanced prevention mechanisms likely requires a transition to a framework that fills the significant gaps in current transnational law. The Outer Space Treaty focuses primarily on weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Still, as indicated by recent discussions between the UN and participating countries, it is anticipated that similar restrictions will be placed on conventional weapons and Anti-Satellite Weaponry. This extension is likely to be achieved using an incremental approach, as demonstrated with the introduction of Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures (TCBMs)(UNGA 78). These voluntary measures, including pre-launch announcements and the sharing of space situational awareness data, help reduce the risk of misperception and enhance collective trust among all stakeholders. Likewise, the growing role of marketable realities underscores the value of regulating private actors through robust public licensing and supervision frameworks, as envisaged under Composition VI of the Outer Space Treaty. Effective policy can also benefit from integrating environmental protection with security enterprises, as conditioning such as destructive kinetic tests can induce magpie debris. Clinging to sustainability norms is considered essential for long-term orbital stability(UN COPUOS, 2021). Eventually, a secure space sphere is stylishly supported by inclusive global governance that ensures the participation of developing and emerging space nations. By fostering a ‘combined future for humanity’, the transnational community can move towards a rules-based order that balances technological innovation with collaborative stewardship. This gradational approach, counting on soft law and the development of behavioural norms, provides a realistic pathway for modernising current space security governance.

7.    Conclusion: Conserving External Space as a Peaceful Global Commons

The current transnational legal framework provides a vital foundation for space conditioning; however, it encounters structural limitations in addressing the ultramodern technological shifts. Contemporary challenges, from binary-use capabilities to the accumulation of orbital debris, have strained the practical effectiveness of the PAROS. Nevertheless, PAROS remains an essential principle for maintaining strategic stability and ensuring that the route remains a sanctuary for peaceful inquiry. The expansion of conditioning beyond Earth suggests that legal and institutional modernisation is a matter of growing significance. Conserving the outer space as a participatory global commons requires a commitment to transnational cooperation and indifferent stewardship. A collaborative focus on dialogue and the development of participatory behavioural norms provides a sustainable path to achieving long-term stability in external space governance.